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Finding a site to store spent fuel 

in the Pacific Basin 

By Gun a S. Selvaduray, Mark K. Goldstein and 

Robert N. Anderson* 

How can one decide on a site to store spent L WR fuel, after the 
Presidential embargo on reprocessing? In this article, Palmyra 
Island is identified as the best site for the nations bordering the 
Pacific to store spent fuel. The quantitative methods used to reach 
this decision are outlined. 
Recent US policy statements 1• 2 • 3 have 
identified the need for a spent nuclear 
fuel store. The location of this centre 
poses severe political and geological 
siting problems. The results of improper 
management of nuclear waste are 
international in consequence and hence 
control may best be handled on a multi­
national basis, even though some mem­
ber nations may possess no nuclear 
facilities. Logically, a multinational nuc­
lear community will be established along 
geographic lines as has taken place in 
Europe (Euratom). A future example 
would be the Pacific Basin region 
(Pacatom). This region is composed of 
Australia, with large uranium resources; 
Japan, Taiwan, China, South Korea, 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 
with dependence on nuclear facilities; 
and many countries that have no 
immediate plans for nuclear develop­
ments. 
The great diversity in size, form of 
government, and economic level makes 
this area an excellent candidate for 
analysis. In order to identify a safe and 
acceptable location, the analysis must 
consider all pertinent parameters. The 
first item is the political environment 
that affects waste production and isola­
tion. Certainly, the US policy of non­
proliferation will be dominant in the 
area and consequently it is unlikely that a· 
reprocessing facility would appear in the 
Pacific region in the next 20 years, if 
current US policy continues unchanged. 
This policy means that the waste facility 
*Department of Materials Engineering, San Jose 
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will be orientated principally toward 
recoverable storage of spent fuel rather 
than high level waste disposal. The 
non-proliferation and safety constraints 
require that the method of transport and 
storage meets guidelines. This study will 
focus on developing a formal method of 
analysis for evaluating and comparing 
candidate waste storage sites. 
The political stability of the site is cru­
cial, and would require a politically 
stable country in the region; at present 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the 
United States are the most stable coun­
tries likely to meet this criterion. They 
are also the most advanced technulogi· 
cally, and therefore have a technical 
community suitable for management of a 
spent fuel storage site. However, 
Australia has refused to ac.cept wastes 
from other countries, and this rejection 
would be expected to extend to spent 
fuel. Japan has domestic political prob· 
!ems which make it difficult to site nuc­
lear reactors and other essential nuclear 
facilities. 
President Carter's policy on non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons is an 
important motivating force behind the 
establishment of a waste storage centre, 
and hence, the territorial burden would 
probably be placed on the United 
States. The political problems of any 
State within the USA accepting wastes 
are increasing in severity, even in the 
case of domestic wastes; the problems 
associated with accepting wastes from 
other countries could be insurmount­
able. Therefore, US territories that are 
not part of continental USA, Hawaii OI 
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Table 1. Undisputed US Territory In the Pacific The rating of the respective islands for 
the individual parameters can become a 
Islands Area Population Status very involved process and should ulti­(sq. miles) 
mately include the formulation of Rating 

American Samoa 76 20 051 Organized unincorporated Functions (RF). In this analysis the rat­

and territory ings are based on the authors' know­
Swains Island 1 
Guam 
125 	 ledge of the Pacific Basin. The philoso­209 67044 
Midway Islands 	 phy behind this rating, as well as the2 2356 Unincorporated territory 
Wake Island 3 1 097 Weight Vector, will be explained with 
Johnston Island 1 156 	 examples ofhow Rating Functions could 
Sand be formulated. Palmyra Island 4 	 0 
Kingman Reef (1) 0 Of primary importance is the popula­
Howland, Baker, tion of the island; it would be desirable if 
Jarvis 3 0 	 the island were totally uninhabited by 
civilians at the present time. It is consi­
dered that the presence of a military 
term. The island siting of a spent fuel population might not only be acceptable, Table 2. Primary site requirements 
store has been considered by the EPA 5 but actually could be desirable in terms 
Uninhabited, not too close to any large popu­ and the Department of Energy6 , and of defence of the centre. At the same 
lated islands, and not belonging to a State of negotiations between the USA and time, the political stability of the islandthe USA Japan on this issue have been reported would probably be the single mostShould not be near territories used for nuclear 
testing or any Trust Terriiories which do not recently7 • important criterion. As such, both 
belong to the USA The islands considered in the siting "Habitation" and "Undisputed US 
Should have undisputed US territorial owner­ analysis are shown in Table 1. Islands Territory'' are assigned weights of 10 on 
• ship 
offer natural barriers to inhibit acciden­ a weighting scale of1 to 10. For sociolog­Should not be of great resource or military value 
Area of at least half a square mile (160 acres) tal intrusions, and the importance of sec­ ical and regional sensitivity reasons, it is 
Should have a natural harbour or a reef or other urity arrangements for such a facility is desirable to locate such a site away from 
projections which would make it suitable tor obvious. The US island territories in the Nuclear Test Areas. 
creating a harbour Pacific are far enough away from all Geological and climatological stabil­Air accessibility 
Near geometrical centre of spent fuel generation large population centres to make acces­ ity is desirable. A minimum size of 100 
sites sibility to unauthorized groups difficult. acres will be needed for the facility and 
Fresh water supply Only by sea and air transport can one get another 100 acres for housing and per­Geological and climatological stability to or leave these islands. Sea transport is sonnel use. Sea access is a minimum 
Alaska are the only possibilities left. slow enough that interception from US requirement, and air access is strongly 
Young and Leslie 4 have proposed military bases in the Pacific (e.g. Pearl recommended. From a transport point 
Canada, the USA, Mexico, Japan, Harbor, Guam) would not be a problem. of view, the centre should be as close to 
South Korea and Taiwan as a likely con­ Even if air transport were used by any the geometrical centre of spent fuel gen­
sortium to be in need of a spent fuel "invaders", there probably would be eration sites as possible; and these sites 
storage facility at the Second Pacific sufficient time for US supersonic fighters are expected to be Canada, USA, Mex­
Basin Conference. to intercept them before any large popu­ ico, Japan, and perhaps Taiwan and 
There is currently more spent fuel lation centres are reached. Such inter­ South Korea. 
being generated on the American side of ceptions would be t:xpected to occur The presence of natural resources, 
the Pacific, but in the long run these over the oceans. e.g. oil, phosphates, etc., would be a 
quantities may become more equitably The parameters shown in Table 2 are deterrent to use of the island, as would 
balanced. Therefore, for ease of trans­ considered important in the selection of the island's value as a military base. For 
port, a location in the middle of the an internationally acceptable spent fuel purposes of defence, it is important that 
Pacific would be suitable for the long storage site in the Pacific Basin. the selected site be within close range, 
Table 3. Table of ratings and performance Indices (PI) 
Weight Vector (W) 10 10 10 5 5 5 2 2 2 5 
American Samoa 0 5 5 1 5 5 2 2 2 172 
Swain Islands 0 10 5 5 5 1 1 2 2 216 
Guam 0 5 5 1 5 5 2 2 2 172 
Midway 1 5 5 0 5 5 2 2 1 175 
Wake 1 5 5 0 5 5 2 2 175 
Johnston 1 10 5 0 5 5 2 2 225 
Sand 5 10 5 1 5 5 2 2 270 
Kingman 10 10 5 5 0 1 1 2 293 
Palmyra 10 10 5 5 5 5 2 2 340 
Howland 10 10 5 5 5 1 1 2 318 
Baker 10 10 5 5 5 1 1 2 318 
Jarvis 10 10 5 5 5 1 1 2 318 
September 1979 	
Table 4. Ability of the sites to meet Minimum Acceptability 
Requirements 
American Samoa 0 1 1 0 
Swain Islands 0 1 1 0 
Guam 0 1 1 0 
Midway 1 0 1 0 
Wake Island 1 0 1 0 
Johnston 1 0 1 0 
Sand 1 1 1 1 1 
Kingman 1 1, 1 0 0 
Palmyra 1 1 1 1 1 
Howland 1 1 1 1 1 
Baker 1 1 1 1 1 
Jarvis 1 1 1 1 1 
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say 1000 miles, of major US bases like 
Pearl Harbor or Guam. Two thousand 
miles is considered as the maximum 
tolerable distance for reasonable 
defence of the chosen site. The presence 
of fresh water would be desirable, but if 
not available, a sea water converter 
could be installed. 
The Table of Ratings with computed 
Performance Indices is shown in Table 
3. The ability of the sites to meet the 
Minimum Acceptability Requirements, 
and the computed product of the com­
ponents of the Acceptability Vector is 
shown in Table 4. Table Slists the SAPI 
values computed according to the 
methods outlined (see box). 
The preliminary analysis reported 
here shows Palmyra Island to be the best 
choice with Howland, Baker and Jarvis 
Islands being second choice. 
Palmyra Island is approximately 1100 
miles south-south-east of Honolulu, and 
is very close to the Intertropical Con­
vergence Zone. Tropical storms form 
frequently in the eastern tropical Pacific, 
many reaching hurricane force, but their 
tracks are generally northwesterly, thus 
carrying them toward Hawaii and not 
near enough to Palmyra to affect the 
island. 8 The other source area for tropi­
cal storms and typhoons lies to the west 
of the island, and their tracks to the 
north or northwest actually carry them 
away from Palmyra. Since Palmyra lies 
between the two areas of tropical storms 
Decision Analysis Methodology 

It is important to realize that the 
selection of a site for a nuclear facil­
ity should be based on formal deci­
sion analysis methodologies. Such 
an approach ensures that all relev­
ant factors are considered and 
clarifies the basis upon wbich the 
decision was made. 
One commonly used approach is 
the Sieve Method according to 
which candidate sites are examined 
sequentially against a set of neces­
sary criteria, as shown in Fig 1. 
While this approach can be 
extremely useful in narrowing down 
the number of sites to be consi­
dered, it does not give any indica­
tion o,f the relative merit of sites 
when more than one site is deemed 
acceptable. 
Fig. 1. The sieve method for decision 
making. 
In this paper the authors wish to 
report a decision analysis 
methodology in which the sites can 
be tested for acceptability against 
set criteria, while at the same time 
permitting the sites to be evaluated 
relative to one another. The proce­
dure consists of the following steps: 
1. Identification of candidate sites 
S1, S2, .... Sn. 
2. Identification of parameters for 
decision analysis, P1, P2, .... Pm. 
3. Identification of the weights each 
parameter is to have in the deci­
sion analysis process. This we 
shall call the weight vector, W, 
which will be a (1 x m) matrix. 
4. Establishment of an (m x n) mat­
rix for the purpose of rating the 
performance of each site for each 
of the parameters, as shown 
below. The Rating Rii denotes the 
rating of site j for parameter i. This 
rating can be done on either a 
comparative basis, or absolute 
basis; in either case the utility 
function upon which rating is to 
be based must be clearly defined. 
Matrix of Ratings (m x n) 
..... 
..!!' 0 0 
~ 
q "' ~ ~ 
Parameter 1 R, R12 R,n 
Parameter 2 R21 R22 R2n 
I I 
Parameter m Rm, Rm2 Rmn 
5. The establishment of threshold 
or acceptable values within which' 
the ratings must fall, e.g. 
X< Rlj < y, 

Rii < z, or Ail > m. 

6. The formation of an acceptability 
vector A, which will be a (1 x m) 
matrix. The components of this 
vector will consist of 1 and 0, 
respectively indicating that the 
rating is within acceptable limits 
or not. 
7. The calculation of Performance 
Indices (PI) for each site based on 
the formula: 
PI= W·RJ 
This computed Performance 
Index is a scalar quantity that 
gives values with which to com­
pare the candidate sites relative 
to one another. 
B. The ability of the site to meet 
minimum acceptability require­
ments (MAR) is determined by 
computing the product of the 
components of A, i.e. 
m 
MAR= 7T Ail 
1~1 
MAR can only have values 1 or 0, 
the former. indicating that all 
minimum acceptability require­
ments have been met, and the lat­
ter indicating that one or more of 
these requirements have not 
been met. 
9. Finally, the Site Acceptability and 
Performance Index, (SAPI) is 
computed thus: 
m 
SAP I = 7T Ail (W·R1) 
i~1 
Iteration of this calculation for all 
sites (j = 1 ton) will result in either 
zero, or non-zero positive values 
of SAPI. Those sites having a zero 
SAPI value have not met one or 
more of the minimum require­
ments and can thus be excluded 
from the analysis. The sites with 
non-zero positive values of SAPI 
have met all the minimum 
requirements and the site with the 
highest SAPI value can be consi­
dered the best site for the W 
(weight vector) used in the 
analysis. This calculation can be 
reiterated for different W's to 
reflect the desired weights the 
analyst chooses to assign to each 
parameter, as well as for sensitiv­
ity analyses. 
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Table 5. Computed SAPI values 
PI 7TAI SAP I 
I=I W;RI 
American Samoa 172 0 0 
Swain Islands 216 0 0 
Guam 172 0 b 
Midway 175 0 0 
Wake Island 175 0 0 
Johnston 225 0 0 
Sand 270 1 270 
Kingman 293 0 0 
Palmyra 340 1 340 
Howland 318 1 318 
Baker 318 1 318 
Jarvis 318 1 318 
in the Pacific, it can thus be considered 
quite safe climatologically. Rainfall is 
high, with a mean of 163 .86in per 
annum, and a minimum of 121.66in per 
annum. 9 As such, the rainfall can be used 
as a source of fresh water. Palmyra is 
geologically stable, with no seismic activ­
ity. 
There is a ship channel. Both this 
channel and the harbour are adequate 
for tug and barge operations. It could be 
cheapest to use this form of surface 
transport from Honolulu. -The present 
airfield runway at 6000ft might be ade­
quate, but it should be cleared and com­
pletely resurfaced with a seal coat that 
would allow the use of jet aircraft that 
require a paved surface .1 0 
The Decision Analysis Methodology 
reported here permits formal decision 
analysis using sophisticated techniques 
while at the same time maintaining the 
required level of simplicity to make it 
comprehensible. Inclusion of the weight 
vector will clarify the relative impor­
tance of the parameters in the 
decision-making process. The next stage 
c;?f this work is to formulate the Rating 
Fl!nctions for each of the parameters, 
factor-in the reliability of the available 
data, and compute SAPI values along 
with their confidence intervals. 
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